



CEPAL ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 
COMISION ECONOM1CA PARA AMERICA LATIN A 
Meeting of Experts on the Caribbean in the Eighties 
Barbados, 19-21 May, 1980 
THE CARIBBEAN AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER* 
William G. Demas 
Caribbean Development Bank 
*This article appeared in the August 1978 issue of the Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and is reproduced here for the use of the 
participants in the Meeting of Experts on the Caribbean in the 
Eighties by kind permission of the above journal. 

W1I.I.IAM G. DKMAS 
Caribbean Development Bant 
Si. Michael. Barbados. W. I 
THE CARIBBEAN AND THE 
NEW INTERNA TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
Caribbean Political Economy 
WHA T IS THE CA RISBEA N: 
Definition of categories is an age-old scholastic and often 
sterile pastime. But in discussing the Caribbean, definitions 
are essential, particularly in these days when there is growing 
fuzziness as to what constitutes the Caribbean. 
The fact is that there are three separate but overlapping defini-
tions of the Caribbean in widespread use today. 
First, there is the English-speaking Caribbean or the Com-
monwealth Caribbean or West Indies. Nearly all of these 
countries and territories are member states of the Caribbean 
community which comprises the four relatively "more devel-
oped countries" of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad 
and Tobago, and the generally smaller eight relatively "less 
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developed" countries of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. K itts-Nevis-Anguiila, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. 
Outside the community are the Bahamas (which nevertheless 
have informal links with the community) and the tiny British 
colonies of the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and 
Turks and Caicos Islands. These are all islands, with the ex-
ception of the mainland territories of Belize (in Central America) 
and Guyana (in South America). 
All the member states of the Caribbean community, with the 
exception of the mainland countries of Belize and Guyana, 
were united in the West Indies Federation for a short period 
f rom 1958 to 1962. The Federation was the first West Indian-
wide attempt at political and economic integration but it failed 
for a variety of reasons, including growing island nationalism 
and the fear that, in the absence of large amounts of British 
financial aid, the bigger and slightly less poor islands would 
have to carry the smaller and poorer islands. 
More recently an attempt has been made to achieve economic 
integration among the English-speaking Caribbean countries 
through the formation in 1968 of the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA), which developed in 1973-1974 into 
the Caribbean community. The community pursues purely 
economic integration among its member states through the 
Caribbean common market. It also pursues so-called "functional 
cooperation" in many areas, particularly sea and air transport, 
university and general education, and health. In some cases 
such cooperation includes common services, as in university 
education and shipping. Finally, the community seeks to achieve 
coordination of the foreign policies of its independent member 
states. 
Second, there is the area comprising the first group of coun-
tries plus Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, 
and the three French departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
and Cayenne. This area is often referred to as the Caribbean 
Archipelago. It consists of all the islands in the Caribbean 
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sea together with the mainland countries of Belize, Guyana, 
Cayenne, and Suriname. 
More recently a broader concept of the Caribbean has been 
advanced in some quarters. This is the sc-called Caribbean 
basin comprising the Archipelago countries as well as those 
mainland countries whose shores are washed by the Caribbean 
sea—thai is, Mexico, the five Central American Republics, 
Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. 
In fact, one can depict these three concepts of the Caribbean 
in terms of three concentric circles. Using mathematical nota-
tion, Ci would be the English-speaking Caribbean, C2 the Carib-
bean Archipelago, and Ca the Caribbean basin, and we would 
have Cs >Ci > Ci. 
THE CARIBBEAN ARCHIPELAGO 
Anyone with even a superficial knowledge of the history 
of Latin America generally and the area in particular knows 
that the historically and culturally valid definition of the Carib-
bean is that of the Caribbean Archipelago, or C2; This essay 
focuses, therefore, on the Archipelago—although the English-
speaking Caribbean, G , will be dealt with extensively. 
The countries and territories of the Caribbean area as here 
defined have a combined land area of 281,423 square miles 
and a total population of 28 million, making the area a poten-
tially economically viable one—if the several formidable bar-
riers in the way of integration could ever possibly be overcome. 
When we look closely at the countries and territories of 
the Caribbean Archipelago, we find a variety of levels of consti-
tutional development, types of political systems, economic 
ideologies, and development strategies, as well as considerable 
variation in size, population, and endowment of natural 
resources and linguistic and cultural patterns. 
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Constitutional Patterns and External Associations 
The independent countries of the area are (in order 
of year of achievement of independence) Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Cuba in the nineteenth century, and, beginning in 
1962, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, 
Bahamas, Grenada, and Suriname. (It should be noted that 
the English-speaking countries and Suriname achieved their 
independence in the 1960s and 1970s.) 
All the other countries of the Caribbean area are politically 
dependent territories. Puerto Rico has a unique status of Free 
Associated State with the United States involving a very close 
political relationship with the United States of whose customs 
and currency areas it forms part. The same applies to the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, except that the extent of internal autonomy 
is less than in Puerto Rico. 
The English-speaking politically dependent territories 
include the British associated states, which have full internal 
self-government, but with Britain still being responsible for 
defense and external affairs. There are five colonies—internally 
self-governing Belize on the Central American mainland and 
the four very small individual islands or groups of islands 
of British Virgin islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and 
Turks and Caicos Islands. 
The Netherlands Antilles consist of a federation of six self-
governing islands, with the Kingdom of the Netherlands being 
responsible for defense and external affairs. The Netherlands 
Antilles, like the Associated States of Britain, are more fully 
internally self-governing than Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. 
The English- and Dutch-speaking territories were, until 
recently, involved in reciprocal preferential trade agreements 
with their respective metropolitan countries, but these prefer-
ential agreements have now been replaced by the Lomé Con-
vention on trade and aid between the EEC and the independent 
countries, and between the EEC and the dependent territories 
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. These new arrangements 
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have abolished the "reverse" preferences which the associated 
countries and territories formerly granted to the metropolitan 
countries. 
Finally, we should mention the French Overseas departments 
of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Cayenne which are juridically 
parts of metropolitan France and which participate directly in 
French elections. 
Political Systems and Economic Ideologies 
There is considerable variety in political systems and economic 
ideologies. Cuba has a centrally planned socialist economy and 
close economic ties with the Soviet Union and recently became 
a full member of COMECON. Guyana and Jamaica are moving 
toward Third World socialism and democratic socialism, 
respectively. Dominican Republic and Haiti tend to be rather 
conservative in their economic ideologies. The other indepen-
dent countries of the area—Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago—have more or less 
"centrist" ideologies, Barbados having a fairly well-devei-
oped "Welfare State" and Trinidad and Tobago being some-
what more "left" (in the sense of a larger state-owned sector 
and conscious policies of income redistribution) than the others. 
The politically dependent territories obviously have less 
freedom of choice in such matters. Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands are highly integrated in a very dependent manner 
into the U.S. economy, with free emigration opportunities to 
the metropolis, and also receive a high level of welfare-oriented 
transfer payments f rom the Mainland. Puerto Rico's develop-
ment strategy has over the last three decades resulted in a 
large increase in per capita income and exports of manufac-
tured goods which now exceed the traditional exports of sugar, 
tobacco, and the needlework industries. But unemployment 
remains high, the food-producing sector is depressed, and 
the problem of a more equitable distribution of income remains. 
Economic and financial integration between France and 
her three Caribbean overseas departments goes so far as to 
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make it impossible to talk of the "national economy" of any 
of the three departments. Their economies are the most highly 
artificial in an area in which there is considerable artificiality 
of national economies. There exists nothing even remotely 
approaching the levels of production in agriculture, industry, 
and tourism achieved in highly dependent Puerto Rico. The 
economies produce virtually nothing and rest to an alarming 
extent on the basis of massive transfer payments f rom France. 
In the remaining British Associated States, colonies, and 
the Netherlands Antilles there is a smaller degree of dependent 
integration into the metropolitan economies than in the U.S. 
territories and the French departments. 
Size, Population, and Natural Resources 
Marked differences in geographical size, population, and 
natural resource endowment also exist. 
The northwest islands of the Greater Antilles are much larger 
than those of the Lesser Antilles in the east. Cuba, the largest 
Caribbean island, has a population of over 9 million and a land 
area of 44,000 square miles. It is not densely populated and 
is fairly well endowed with large areas of land suitable for 
agriculture and livestock and with mineral deposits of nickel 
and copper. Dominican Republic and Haiti have populations 
of roughly 4 lA million each and areas of 19,000 and 11,000 
square miles respectively; but Haiti has a much denser popu-
lation (428 as against 251 persons per square mile) on the smaller 
and more mountainous and infertile part of the island of His-
paniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti 
has relatively small deposits of bauxite and copper and some 
hydroelectric potential, while the Dominican Republic has 
deposits of bauxite, copper, and nickel. Puerto Rico has no 
significant mineral deposits (except copper) and a high popu-
lation density of 900 persons per square mile. Jamaica, the other 
country forming part of the Greater Antilles, has like Haiti, large 
areas of mountainous terrain, but is somewhat better endowed 
for agricultural and livestock production than Haiti. It has a 
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population density of 463 persons per square mile. On the 
other hand, it is very richly endowed v/ith bauxite, in the produc-
tion of which it is, after Australia, the world's largest supplier. 
All the islands of the Greater Antilles have very good tourism 
potential. 
Generally speaking, the islands of the Lesser Antilles are 
geographically smaller in size, have small and very dense popu-
lations and little, if any, by way of mineral resources. Trinidad 
and Tobago, the largest of the Lesser Antilles, has a population 
of 3 million; Barbados 250,000; and the seven English-speaking 
Leeward and Windward Islands have very small populations 
with the largest, Grenada and St. Lucia, having approximately 
110,000 inhabitants. Like those in the Greater Antilles, nearly 
all the islands of the Lesser Antilles have sun, sea, and beaches 
which constitute tourist attractions. The only significant 
producer of minerals in this group is Trinidad and Tobago, 
which, however, is a minor producer of oil by world standards. 
The mainland countries of Belize, Guyana, Suriname, and 
Cayenne have much bigger land areas, but very low population 
densities. They all have considerable by no means yet fully 
exploited agricultural, livestock, and forestry potential and, 
in the case of Guyana and Suriname, considerable deposits of 
bauxite and other minerals such as gold. In addition, there 
are rich fishing and shrimp banks off the three Guianas. 
Differences in Language and Culture 
Apart from these constitutional, political, economic, and 
geographical differences between the countries and territories 
of the Caribbean area, there are certain linguistic and cultural 
differences—French influence in Haiti; Spanish in Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico; English in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean; Dutch in Suriname and the Netherlands 
Antilles; French in the three overseas departments of France. 
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S 
UNDER LYING UNITY OF CARIBBEAN DESPITE FRAGMENTATION 
In the face of such bewildering variety, is there any meaning 
as to whether the countries of the Caribbean Archipelago in 
any way have much in common with each other? It is possible 
to highlight many common features of these countries. These 
common features spring from history and geography. 
To students of Caribbean history it is obvious that the Carib-
bean Archipelago countries have a common historical legacy: 
the sugar plantation, slavery, indentured labor, monocultural 
economies producing what they did not consume and con-
suming what they did not produce, a heavy African input into 
their populations and many common cultural features associated 
with this in spite of linguistic differences, and (with the ex-
ception of Haiti) perhaps the longest period of external poli-
tical dependence of any part of the Third World. Finally, there 
is the fact that, in spite of the sea which separates them, they 
all belong to a geographically distinct part of the world. (It 
is this distinctness, this Caribbean identity, which makes for 
the inclusion of the Mainland countries of Belize, Guyana, 
Suriname, and Cayenne side by side with the Archipelago 
islands in the Caribbean area.) 
At the same time, historically the economies have been 
highly dependent on the various metropolitan countries in 
terms of . trade, transport, and communications, technology, 
direct foreign investment, and, more recently, economic aid 
as well as outlets for emigration (including the brain drain). 
In one word, the historical legacy of these countries can be 
said to be one of extreme external economic dependence and 
lack of "linkages" between the various sectors of the national 
economies of each country and between the sectors of the various 
countries. Intra-area trade and other economic transactions 
were unable to develop to any significant extent, the individual 
countries being tied "vertically" to their particular metro-
politan country rather than "horizontally" with each other. 
Even today the Caribbean remains one of the most highly 
economically fragmented, dependent, and "balkanized" areas 
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of the Third World, both politically and economically. Very 
obviously, they are separated by the sea. The islands and the 
mainland countries of Belize in Central America and Guyana, 
Suriname, and Cayenne on the South American mainland are 
geographically separated by the sea—a very effective barrier 
in the absence of an excellent system of sea and air transpor-
tation and of telecommunications, which does not yet exist. 
Nevertheless, whatever may be the shortcomings of most of 
the individual Caribbean countries and territories from the 
point of view of resources, population size, and markets, it is 
clear thai the Caribbean area, regarded as a group, has a reason-
ably large population of just under 30 million and a fairly good 
and diversified natural resource base—agricultural land, live-
stock potential, forestry resources, fisheries, bauxite, nickel, 
copper, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric power, and the sun, sea, 
and sand required for a certain type of tourism. (The full miner-
al potential of the three Guianas is also yet unknown.) 
What is true of the 30-million Caribbean area is also true 
of the 5-million Caribbean community. Regarded as a group, 
they have, in relation to their total population, almost as wide 
a range of natural resources as the wider Caribbean Archipelago, 
whatever may be their natural resource and demographic limita-
tions at the individual country level. 
SIZE, DEPENDENCE, PER CAPITA INCOME, AND DEVELOPMENT 
Nervertheless, one must realistically admit that the individual 
countries and territories of both the Caribbean community 
and the wider Caribbean Archipelago countries suffer f rom 
certain disadvantages in terms of their autonomous economic 
development. These disadvantages are the legacy of external 
dependence combined with small size of population and a narrow 
range of natural resources at the individual country level. 
The historical legacy of dependence is not in dispute. There 
is, however, a more lively debate concerning the effects of 
small size on the capacity for autonomous economic devel-
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opments; questions are even often raised as to whether small 
island populations of less than 100,000 can with any meaning 
maintain the substance of their political independence, once 
they achieve it. 
In discussing the legacy and the present reality of external 
economic dependence, we have to draw immediate attention 
to an economic fact that is of the highest importance for an 
understanding of the Caribbean economy today—the existence 
of per capita incomes in both the politically dependent and 
independent countries Of the area (except for Haiti) that are 
relatively high by Third World standards. But, paradoxically 
enough, the extremely long history of Caribbean external 
economic dependence and close association with the metro-
politan countries has resulted in glacially slow and gradual 
"trickle-down" effects. Nevertheless, the relatively high levels 
of per capita income are a highly misleading and inappropriate 
index of the present level of economic development of the coun-
tries and territories of the area. They have to be qualified to 
take account of the very high levels of unemployment and under-
employment, of an often high degree of inequality of income 
distribution, of lagging and backward food-producing sectors, 
and of an undiversified structure of production and exports. 
Even more fundamentally, the per capita income figure conceals 
the true nature of economic underdevelopment, which is a dis-
torted and highly unbalanced economic structure incapable of' 
meeting the basic needs of the rural and urban masses and 
lacking in internal economic resilience in the face of adverse 
economic impacts of external origin. Thus, the Caribbean 
economies, in spite of the relatively high levels of per capita 
income, are riddled with all the features of "dependent under-
development." 
In discussing the issue of size, I cannot go into all the rami-
fications of this debate except to stress that those who do not 
see any inherent disadvantages in small size stress the political 
and cultural will of the people of a very small country to survive 
and the need for indigenous technological innovation in such 
countries. They sometimes even stress the advantages of small 
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size in terms of greater amenability to economic management 
and a greater sense of identity and community solidarity among 
the people of a small nation-state. Finally, they make the valid 
point that the quality of human resources of a country can 
more than compensate for a lack of natural resources. 
Those who have doubts about the economic viability of 
very small countries tend to stress the overwhelming significance 
of economies of large scale in terms of administration, national 
markets, and the scope for the application of efficient capital-
intensive technologies. They also point out that in small coun-
tries it is difficult to have the wide range of both human and 
natural resources required for an indigenously motivated pat-
tern of economic development. 
One obvious qualification to the simple notion of size is, 
however, the volume of natural resources, the most outstanding 
case in point being Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which 
are all richly endowed with petroleum resources in spite of their 
very small land area and population. 
Be this as it may, in terms of the individual countries of both 
the Caribbean Archipelago and Caribbean community (par-
ticularly in the very small islands), natural resources on an 
individual country basis tend to be either very limited or highly 
skewed in favor of a certain agricultural or mineral commodity 
or commodities. Moreover (and again, particularly in the smaller 
islands), trained human resources are subject to continuous 
depletion as a result of the brain drain to North America, and, 
what is more, with populations that are so small in absolute 
numbers it is extremely difficult to have a sufficiently wide 
range of the skills required for internally motivated economic 
and social development. 
RA TIONA LE A ND PROBLEMS OF CA RIBBEA N 
A RCHIPELAGO INTEGRA TION 
We therefore immediately come upon one of the most 
central issues in Caribbean economic development—the need for 
meaningful economic integration. Thus, the prospects for au-
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tonomous development of the Caribbean Archipelago and the 
more geographically limited Caribbean community would 
obviously be enhanced by schemes of integration and economic 
cooperation bringing a wider market and a wider range of 
human and natural resources (including low density of popu-
lation in countries such as Belize, Guyana, Suriname, Cayenne, 
and Cuba). 
One important corollary of this point of view is that the 
prospects for economic and financial viability in the newly 
independent and about-to-be independent Caribbean coun-
tries that are small in terms of population would seem in large 
measure to depend in most cases on the successful implementa-
tion of realistic schemes df economic and even political inte-
gration and cooperation. This proposition holds with particular 
force for those very small English-speaking and Dutch-speaking 
Caribbean countries either newly independent, such as Grenada, 
or on the verge of independence—the British Associated States 
of Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia 
and St. Vincent, and the Holland-affiliated Federation of the 
Netherlands Antilles. Indeed, some, including myself, would 
go further and argue that the entire English-speaking group of 
the Leeward and Windward Islands should • have proceeded 
to independence as a single group, not only for reasons of size 
of market and human and natural resource endowment, but 
also because of the need to achieve more economic and effective 
administrative services and the need, because of their weak-
ness in all spheres, to present a single f ront in all external 
relations and contact with the outside world. A smaller number 
of persons, again including myself, would go even further aryd 
urge the view that the only way in which the small English-
speaking countries of the eastern Caribbean (not only the 
Leeward and Windward Islands but also Barbados, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Guyana) can achieve meaningful economic 
and political independence and cultural identity in the face 
of the powerful external economic, diplomatic, geopolitical, 
and political forces (emanating from more powerful large 
and medium-sized states as well as the transnational corpora-
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tions) is by establishing a political union among themselves. 
I must, however, admit that in the present climate of West Indian 
thinking, both these viewpoints would today be regarded as 
Utopian by all the countries concerned. So the smaller Leeward 
and Windward Islands are clearly now proceeding to individual 
independence, and only time will tell whether their individual 
independence will ever be a reality from a substantive rather 
than a formal point of view. 
More generally, the immediate or near-term scope for 
Caribbean integration would seem to be reduced by many 
powerful factors (both historical and contemporary) making 
for Caribbean fragmentation and disintegration. 
Because of the present peculiar constitutional and economic 
ties which Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands. Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, arid Cayenne have with their metropolitan coun-
tries, one cannot at present discuss meaningfully the inclusion 
of these territories in any scheme of Caribbean economic 
integration. For technical economic reasons having to do with 
the existence of a centrally planned economy in Cuba, the 
inclusion of this country in a comprehensive scheme of Carib-
bean economic integration must also be ruled out. On the other 
hand, there are clearly no such compelling economic (as distinct 
from diplomatic and political) reasons why Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Suriname, and (in time) an independent Netherlands 
Antilles should be ruled out from participating in such a scheme. 
Comprehensive economic integration is one thing. Loose 
arrangements for economic cooperation and functional col-
laboration are another. Therefore, there is great immediate 
scope for a greater degree of economic cooperation and func-
tional collaboration among all the countries and territories 
of the Caribbean area. 
NA TIONA L DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS A ND STRA TEG1ES 
Let us now summarily list the main economic problems 
facing most of the countries of the Caribbean Archipelago in 
general, and the Caribbean community in particular, and 
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mention briefly the strategies which could be and are in some 
cases being applied in overcoming these constraints to develop-
ment. 
From the previous discussion in which we dealt with his-
torical legacy and small size, it should not be surprising that 
the following figure prominently among the development 
problems of the area: 
(a) a very large food import bill amounting for the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries alone to nearly US $0.5 billion or about 
US 580 per head of population—perhaps one of the highest 
per capita food import bills in the Third World; 
(b) a heavily undiversifxed and specialized structure of production, 
with dependence on a single crop or a limited number of ex-
port products such as sugar, bananas, coffee, citrus, oil and 
natural gas, bauxite and alumina, and tourism; 
(c) corresponding dependence on a very wide range of imports, 
not only of capital goods but also intermediate goods as well 
as food and other consumer goods (Cuba and to some extent 
Guyana are exceptions); 
(d) the fact that export agriculture is high-cost and on the decline, 
partly because of low productivity and partly because of the 
relatively high wage-rates spilling over from high productivity 
and better paid sectors (minerals and tourism); sugar, bananas, 
and citrus are the most seriously affected export crops in the 
countries belonging to the Caribbean community; 
(e) an absence of economic linkages between different sectors of 
the national economy—e.g., agriculture and industry, agri-
culture and Tourism, mining and manufacturing, and so on; 
manufacturing and tourism, in particular, rely to an excessive 
degree on inputs imported from outside the area; 
(f) the inability so far of the manufacturing sector to achieve sig-
nificant levels of extraregional exports; 
(g) in spite of relatively high levels of per capita income, economies 
with a strong lack of resilience in the face of adverse economic 
developments of external origin; 
(h) low levels of national savings (in the household, public, and 
corporate sectors) and corresponding excessively high levels 
and inappropriate patterns of consumption; 
(i) above all, alarmingly high levels of unemployment (ranging 
from 14% to 30% of the labor force) and equally high levels 
of low-earning underemployment. 
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The development strategies that could be implemented (and 
which are beginning to be implemented by many countries in 
the area) can easily be seen: 
(a) efforts to increase levels of food production for the domestic 
and regional markets; 
(b) efforts to diversify both the internal composition of economic 
activities and the composition of exports and imports (there is 
also need to diversify both the country destination of exports 
and the country source of imports to the extent that doing these 
things would be economic in the long run); 
(c) efforts to promote more linkages as between various sectors 
and activities of the individual national economies and as be-
tween the various sectors and activities of different countries 
in the region; 
(d) efforts to foster trade specialization and cooperation in produc-
tion at the regional or area levels; 
(e) efforts to make more competitive traditional agricultural export 
crops; 
(f) efforts to increase sales of manufactured goods extraregionally; 
(g) efforts at an "incomes and prices" policy; and 
(h) efforts to adapt imported technology as well as to encourage 
the development and use of technologies more appropriate to 
the countries of the region. 
We must note here that many of the apparently purely 
economic constraints to Caribbean economic development 
arise f rom factors usually relevant to political economy rather 
than to economics proper. The aversion to both peasant and 
wage-labor agriculture among many sections of the population 
is a sociological parameter rooted in the historical legacy of 
slavery and in the low value and status assigned to agriculture 
as an occupation. High levels and inappropriate patterns of 
consumption arise again f rom the impact of the consumption 
patterns of the affluent North American and West European 
societies, imported through the advertising in and the images 
conveyed by the electronic mass media (particularly television), 
the presence of many tourists in the countries, and the proximity 
of North America. The high levels of unemployment can be 
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partly explained by the widespread imitative use of inap-
propriate capital-intensive technologies imported without 
modification with a view to better suiting local factor endow-
ments. They can also be explained by the deficiencies of a 
colonial-inherited elitist and often inappropriate system of 
education, deficient in opportunities and motivations for 
technical and vocational training and failing miserably in 
integrating the "world of school" with the "world of work." 
Finally, "Western" types of trade unionism and generally 
free collective bargaining processes also facilitate the trans-
mission of high wages f rom the mineral or tourism sectors 
into the public and agricultural sectors, making for low or 
negative public sector surpluses and high costs of agricultural 
production. But under the political systems existing in most 
if not all the countries of the area, the application of incomes 
and prices policies is notoriously difficult. 
The existence of these "political economy constraints" on 
autonomous patterns of development implies that funda-
mentally the development problems of the area can be tackled 
effectively only through the political process which would 
have to undertake the onerous tasks of radically restructuring 
educational and training systems and initiating changes in 
values and attitudes in relation to lifestyles, work habits, levels 
and patterns of consumption, and propensities to technological 
adaptation and innovation. Let it be noted here that the present 
political institutions and mechanisms devised to preserve and 
promote traditional civil and political rights and liberties 
inherited f rom the metropolitan powers could, under many 
circumstances, prove inconsistent (at least in some degree) "with 
the kinds of political processes required to push through the 
necessary far-reaching changes in values and attitudes. 
In the light of the prevailing frailness of economic struc-
tures, all the Caribbean countries (with the sole exception of 
Trinidad and Tobago, a minor exporter and producer of oil by 
world standards) have been adversely affected by the inter-
national economic crisis which had its onset in 1973-1974 
resulting in considerably higher prices for oil as well as for 
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imports of manufactured goods and food f rom the industrial-
ized countries. The subsequent recession in the industrialized 
countries also added to the impact of these adverse developments 
on the Caribbean countries which were faced with worsening 
terms of tirade, a slowing down of demand for their exports in 
the industrialized countries, imported inflation, and con-
sequently very severe baiarace-of-payments and fiscal dif-
ficulties'. 
The Caribbean And 
The New International Economic Order 
ROLE OF CARIBBEAN IN DIALOGUE ON NEW ORDER 
Many of the independent English-speaking Caribbean 
countries—particularly Guyana and Jamaica—have been in the 
forefront off the demand for a New, International Economic 
Order. These demands have been made both within the UN 
system and outside, as in the case of the disappointing North-
South dialogue of 1975-1977 in Paris. It would be pointless to 
list in this essay all of the demands made by the Third World 
countries in connection with the proposed New International 
Economic Order. I prefer to list certain broad areas which 
appear to be of great significance for the Caribbean countries. 
These are: 
(a) stable and remunerative prices for commodity exports of the 
developing countries; 
(b) better access for semimanufactures and manufactures in the 
markets of the developed countries; 
(c) a greater volume of official development assistance, as far as 
possible on concessional terms, and appropriate action on the 
debt problems of the individual developing countries; 
(d) the need to take into account and act on the special needs of 
developing island economies; 
(e) economic cooperation among developing countries; and 
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(f) a fairer deal from the transnational corporations in respect of 
both direct investment and the transfer of technology. 
In addition, quite apart f rom a restructuring of the inter-
national economic system, greater internal effort in the fields 
of food production and the mobilization of domestic financial 
resources have been stressed by some, as has been the need for 
the pursuit of "basis needs" development strategies—that is 
to say, strategies that aim at structural t ransformation of the 
economy while also meeting the needs of the poor majority of 
the population for a more human and less degraded and deprived 
existence. 
ISSUE OF PARTICULARISTIC OR UNIVERSALISTIC CONCESSIONS 
To begin with, one has to probe deeply and face up to the 
question of whether for countries such as the Caribbean prefer-
ential treatment in protected developed country markets, 
such as the socialist bloc or European economic community, 
are not preferable to "universal" schemes such as the UNCTAD 
proposal. So far as the Caribbean is concerned, this issue 
primarily centers around the prices and volumes of exports 
of sugar and bananas, as well as access for semimanufactured 
and manufactured exports into the markets of the developed 
countries. But it is not a question of either/or. For to the extent 
that the Caribbean countries export on the world market 
outside of these preferential zones, they need both "particu-
laristic" and "universalistic" means of export support . 
Indeed, the real significance of the Lomé Convention is 
that some of the concepts underlying the New International 
Economic Order have been incorporated into the agreement— 
for example, mechanisms to avoid or reduce possible political 
influence on the part of the EEC on the associated developing 
countries; the removal of the provision in the previous Yaounde 
Conventions for the granting of "reverse preferences" by the 
associated developing countries; the recognition of a special 
category of "least developed" countries; and the encouragement 
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of economic cooperation among the associated developing 
countries; and the incorporation of a Commodity Export 
Stabilization Scheme (STABEX). 
We also should not forget that the extent of trade and 
possibly aid advantages conferred on the developing countries 
party to the Lomé Convention is likely to diminish over time, 
so that ultimately the Caribbean countries will get the same 
treatment that Europe gives to other developing countries. 
Accordingly, one can objectively justify the temporary trade 
advantages available to some of the Caribbean countries under 
the present and subsequent five-year conventions as a means 
of enabling them to retain certain preferential treatment which 
they formerly had in the markets of the metropolitan countries 
for certain commodities which they produced either at high 
cost (such as sugar and bananas) or competitively (such as rum). 
In terms of the need for at least temporary props for certain 
important export products, the Caribbean countries con-
cerned constitute a special case among Third^World countries. 
COMMODITIES 
The Caribbean certainly has an interest in the integrated 
program for commodities elaborated by the UNCTAD Secre-
tariat and discussed in both that forum and in the North-South 
dialogue in Paris. Of the 18 commodities selected for the 
common fund approach, sugar, bananas, bauxite, cocoa, and 
coffee are of interest to the Caribbean. s 
It has been often urged by reactionary writers that many 
individual developing countries stand to lose to the extent 
that they would be net importers of many of the 18 commodities. 
The Caribbean would certainly be among such developing 
countries. But this point has, f rom the outset, been recognized 
in the UNCTAD secretariat'^ initial proposal on commodities, 
where it was recommended that the individual developing 
countries who lose by having to pay higher prices for one or 
more imported commodities should receive special compensa-
tion in various ways both from the proposed common fund 
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and f rom other sources of external finance. In this connection, 
one should also take into account the proposal initiated by 
the Commonwealth group of experts on the New International 
Economic Order thaï receipts f rom tourism (an economic 
activity of great importance to many of the Caribbean coun-
tries) should be taken Into account in the operation of the I M F 
scheme off. compensatory financing for export shortfalls in 
developing countries. 
MANUFACTURES 
The Caribbean, as observed earlier, needs to achieve con-
siderable increases in its level off exports of semimanufactures 
and manufactures to extraregional markets, and on the face of 
it would appear to stand to gain considerably f rom the provision 
off better access for such products to the markets off the in-
dustrialized countries. Many of the countries off the area already 
have duty-free access for a wide range off manufactures and 
semimanufactures into the European economic community 
under the Lomé Convention. As developing countries, they 
also have favorable treatment under the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) in the markets of developed countries, such 
as Canada and the United States of America. On the other hand, 
because off relatively high wage-rates in the face of consider-
able unemployment, as well as low volume off exports by indi-
vidual exporting firms, there is reason to believe that high, 
costs of production and small volumes may not make them as 
competitive-as other developing countries—particularly leading 
Third World exporters such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. On these grounds, one can 
argue that they may not be able to take automatic advantage 
of the arrangements for duty-free or low-duty access of both 
the Lomé Convention and the GSP. But this should not be 
allowed to obscure the long-term interest which virtually all 
the countries of the area have, along with other developing 
countries, in preferential access to the markets of the devel-
oped countries. After all, no reasonable government or indi-
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vidual am the Caribbean countries concerned would expect these 
countries to benefit fully f rom every single new arrangement 
made in connection with the New International Economic Order. 
Third World solidarity is essential; for just as any single Third 
World country may not benefit f rom any one area as much as 
others, so are there other areas f rom which a single country 
may benefit more than others. 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
The Caribbean countries, whatever their size, volume, and 
range of natural resources or ideological orientation, are 
heavily dependent on official development assistance and, as 
small countries, receive as a group one of the highest per capita 
levels of aid among Third World countries. This applies to Cuba 
just as much as to Montserrat . This Mgh dependence in the 
case of any single country is the product of one or more of 
the following: 
—diseconomies of very small scale in administration, public services, 
public utilities, and infrastructure; 
—high rat.es of consumption and low rates of national saving in 
relation to Gross National Product; 
—in one or two countries, very rapid rates of economic and social 
transformation desired by the leaders; and 
—very tight foreign exchange constraints in the development 
process." 
On the other hand, the larger and relatively more developed 
countries have been considered "middle-income" countries 
not deserving of official economic aid on concessional terms. 
The call in the New International Economic Order for greater 
volumes of official development assistance for developing 
countries on concessional terms is therefore clearly to the 
advantage of all the Caribbean countries. 
Some of those Caribbean countries where foreign exchange 
constraints are very tight a're now facing a serious problem 
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of external debt service, because of the relatively short maturities 
which characterize their recent borrowing f rom private sources 
and governmental export credit agencies, because of worsened 
terms of trade, balance-of-payments, and fiscal deterioration 
for other reasons, and because in the case of the larger and 
relatively more developed countries, as a result of their relatively 
high per capita income, they have not received sufficient levels 
of official development assistance on sufficiently concessional 
terms. Clearly, all the Commonwealth Caribbean countries 
could gain to the extent that the external debt problem is 
realistically tackled by the international community. 
DEVELOPING ISLAND ECONOMIES 
Nearly all of the Caribbean countries can be characterized 
as small or disadvantaged developing island economies. The 
disadvantages in international economic relations faced by 
these countries have been well analyzed by the U N C T A D 
Secretariat. These disadvantages are small domestic markets; 
separation by sea which makes for high transport costs in 
both international and intraregional trade, even in an inte-
grated market; lack of diversified economic structures; diseco-
nomies of small scale in public services, public utilities, and 
infrastructure; absence in most cases of natural resources; and 
extensive economic dependence on the outside world. Any 
appropriate set of measures which is undertaken by the inter-
national community in favor of developing island countries 
would obviously benefit the Caribbean countries: official 
lending on highly concessional terms; special assistance of 
this nature for interisland transport and communications 
facilities; the use of external financial and technical assistance 
to promote economic integration and cooperation among 
groups of neighboring islands; and technical assistance to 
help such countries to bargain effectively with the transnational 
corporations so as to improve their terms of access to foreign 
shipping services, foreign direct investment, and to technology. 
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One very important aspect of small size and external eco-
nomic dependence in the Caribbean countries is the issue of 
economic cooperation among developing countries. 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
So far the economic integration experiment has been 
limited to the English-speaking Caribbean countries and has 
taken the form of the Caribbean community, of which the most 
important part is the Caribbean common market. The share 
of intra-common market trade in total trade grew f rom 8% 
in 1967 (the year before the freeing of trade under C A R I F T A 
in 1968) to 11% in 1973, and then dropped to 7% in 1976. The 
fact is that the common market is now facing serious dif-
ficulties as a result of import restrictions imposed by Guyana 
and Jamaica against "inessential" products because of their 
very serious foreign exchange difficulties. Now, as every eco-
nomist knows, the benefits of economic integration among 
developing countries are not confined to the benefits arising 
f rom trade liberalization. The reason is that in the long run, 
greater benefits can result f rom cooperation in production 
involving the establishment of complementary structures of 
production and f rom the establishment of certain common 
services in areas such as transportation and communications, 
other infrastructure, research, education, and administration. 
Member states of the Caribbean common market are now 
beginning to implement some of the provisions of the treaty, 
other than those calling for intraregional trade liberalization 
and the establishment of a common external tariff protective 
system. A start has been made on the implementation of the 
regional food plan (including the establishment of the Carib-
bean Food Corporation to implement the plan), and the first 
steps are being taken to implement the system of regional 
industrial programming laid down in the treaty, with priority 
attention being given to the pulp and paper sector, based on 
the forestry resources of the region. 
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Nevertheless, we cannot too lightly dismiss the import restric-
tions on "inessential" light manufactures; fo r while it is true 
that (with the exception of petroleum, fertilizer, and rice) most 
intraregional trade so far consists of products of the light 
manufacturing sector not based to any significant extent on 
local and regional inputs and therefore containing the minimal 
local and regional value added required to meet the rules of 
origin, such industries tend to be relatively labor-intensive, 
with the result that restrictions on intraregional trade can 
produce serious unemployment in those C A R I C O M countries 
whose exports are so restricted. This factor of severe restric-
tions on intraregional trade has led to a certain amount of 
demoralization but not despair among certain groups in the 
member states of CARICOM and particularly among those 
who advocate regional solutions to the development problems 
of the region. 
The solution to these problems of deep structural dis-
equilibrium in the balance-of-payments is for the two or three 
countries seriously affected to make the necessary structural 
adjustments to the large external deficits produced by the 
international economic crisis and subsequent world recession, 
and for them to receive balance-of-payments support to help 
them to adjust quickly and successfully. Fundamentally, full 
adjustment to this situation can be achieved only by increases 
of production (of both import substitutes and exports). Trinidad 
and Tobago, the only oil-producing Caribbean country, xhas 
given a significant amount of balance-of-payments support 
to its less fortunate sister states by making available US$150 
million since the onset of the world economic crisis in 1973-
1974. It is hoped that Trinidad and Tobago will continue giving 
such support and that the World Bank, I M F , and interested 
donor countries will make available adequate amounts of short-
term, medium-term, and long-term balance-of-payment$ sup-
port to CARICOM countries such as Barbados, Guyana and 
Jamaica, and development finance on concessional terms to 
the less developed countries that, because they have no central 
bank and limited monetary independence, experience their 
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balance-of-payments problems in the form of large fiscal 
deficits and shrinkage of both public and private liquidity. 
To the extent that this is done, and intraregional trade in-
creases to precrisis levels, it should be possible for the regional 
movement to move increasingly toward more effective co-
operation in production and the building up, over time, of 
more complementary structures off production. At the same 
time, any efforts among some or all of the smaller countries 
to establish common services among themselves should be 
morally and financially supported both within and outside 
the region. In this way, economic integration will undoubtedly 
create, in the long run, a considerable level of benefits to the 
Caribbean countries. 
Indeed, one essential prerequisite for a just and durable 
scheme of Caribbean economic integration is the provision 
of the maximum feasible raage ©ff opportunities for rapid 
development in the relatively less developed countries. Just 
as the developing countries throughout the world are seeking 
f rom the developed countries the creation of a new and more 
just international order which would make possible their 
soundly based development, so must justice and equity prevail 
in economic integration and cooperation schemes among the 
developing countries themselves. Fortunately, this need has 
always been clearly recognized and acted upon within the 
framework of Caribbean economic integration; for the relatively 
more-developed countries off the community have always seen 
that , if it were otherwise, their case for more just and equitable 
economic treatment by the world's developed countries would 
have no moral basis. 
But there are many, both within the region and outside, 
who question the effectiveness of the concept of economic 
integration among such small countries as an aid to develop-
ment and pin their hopes on much wider economic coopera-
tion among larger numbers of Third World countries. To do 
this, 1 submit, is to throw out the baby with the bath water. 
Economic integration among a group of neighboring Third 
World countries, however small, and economic cooperation 
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among a much bigger number of Third World countries are 
not in conflict with, but are complementary to, each other. 
Indeed, perhaps the best way of setting about economic co-
operation among a large number of developing countries is 
to organize such cooperation on the basis of a gradual devel-
opment of economic links between subregional integration 
schemes or between such schemes and individual large devel-
oping countries. For if we are to be completely objective, we 
must face up to the real possibility of relations of dominance 
and dependence being established, as between Third World 
countries; for these countries, while they quite definitely have 
a fundamental unity of interest with each other, vary consider-
ably in size and economic strength. The Caribbean community 
has a total population of only 5 million persons and consists 
for the most part of either very small or very weak countries. 
The community, while seeking to extend the area of economic 
cooperation with other Third World countries (both in Latin 
America and outside), should give primary emphasis at this 
stage to welding itself into a cohesive unit characterized by 
the closest possible coordination of external economic actions, 
policies, and relationships. This was, it should be noted, the 
rationale behind the formation of the Andean group, under 
which the smaller and medium-sized countries of LAFTA 
formed a subgroup of their own as a means of cooperating 
more easily and equitably with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 
the three giants of LAFTA. Similarly, this type of subregional 
cohesion provides the only sensible basis on which the Carib-
bean community countries should enter into very desirable 
closer economic relationships with the other countries and 
territories of the Caribbean Archipelago as well as with the 
large and relatively more developed and powerful Mainland 
countries of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The Caribbean 
community as a group must also maintain its position of 
negotiating as a group in its developing relations with' other 
Third World countries both within and outside the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific group which have entered into the 
Lomé Convention with the EEC. 
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To say this is not to deny the need for C A R I C O M to "widen" 
itself in the medium term to include other Caribbean Archi-
pelago countries such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and 
Suriname and to develop cooperative relationships with coun-
tries such as Cuba, the Netherlands Antilles, and even con-
ceivably the Erench Antillean departments. This process can 
be initiated by the Caribbean community negotiating either 
trade or economic complementarity agreements and even 
associate membership with other Caribbean Archipelago 
countries. An important step was recently taken toward 
greater economic cooperation among most of the countries 
of the Caribbean Archipelago through the establishment in 
1975 of the Caribbean Development and Cooperation Com-
mittee (CDCC) of the UN Economic Commission of Latin 
America (ECLA). ' The C D C C of ECLA has the following 
memberships: Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Re-
public, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago, with the British Associated States, 
Belize, and the Netherlands Antilles being associate members. 
Another possible route to greater economic cooperation 
among the Caribbean Archipelago countries could emerge to 
the extent that the proposal for the creation of a Caribbean 
Group for Economic Cooperation in development comes 
about. The intention here is that some of the industrialized 
countries with special links with the Caribbean and some of 
the mainland countries whose shores are washed by the Carib-
bean sea join with the C A R I C O M state of Trinidad and Tobago 
in cooperating with the majority of the Caribbean Archipelago 
countries by providing them with additional official devel-
opment assistance within a multi-lateral framework, whilst 
encouraging and promoting present integration and new co-
operation efforts among the potential beneficiaries of such 
aid. Such additional economic aid is intended to be for a limited 
period of time to help the recipient countries, which as a result 
of external international economic factors are now faced with 
considerable economic and financial difficulties. 
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Indeed, the well-recognised | need for the Caribbean countries 
to have closer economic relationships with the Latin American 
countries, while preserving their Caribbean economic and 
cultural identity and increasing the degree of their external 
economic and diplomatic solidarity, can best be accommodated 
within a framework under which: 
(a) multilateral financial assistance is made available to some or 
all of the Caribbean Archipelago countries by the bigger Carib-
bean basin and other Latin American countries, through 
subregional financial institutions controlled by the Caribbean 
countries, such as the Caribbean Development Bank; 
(b) the countries of the Caribbean community as a community 
and not on an individual basis should enter into trade and 
economic complementarity agreements with other countries 
of the Archipelago, with the larger neighboring Caribbean 
basin and with other Latin American countries. (This is so 
both because it would strengthen the bargaining power of the 
individual Caribbean community countries and because it 
would prevent the preemption by third countries of oppor-
tunities for intra-CARICOM trade and economic comple-
mentarity and so strengthen the Caribbean community.) One 
such agreement between Mexico and the Caribbean community 
has recently been entered into. 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. 
AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION 
Because of the long centuries-old history of economically 
dependent association of nearly all the countries of the Carib-
bean Archipelago with developed metropolitan countries, 
resulting in still too many cases of domination of many key 
sectors of their economies by the giant transnational corpora-
tions, most of the Caribbean countries have an interest in the 
demands in the New International Economic Order f o r an 
elimination of the unhealthy economic and political effects 
of the transnational corporations on the sound and balanced 
development and sovereign integrity of Third World countries 
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and for an improvement in the terms under which the technology 
developed by these corporations is "transferred" (or, more 
precisely, sold) to developing countries. Moreover, the call 
for the development and use of more appropriate technology 
in Third World countries suffering f rom heavy structural un-
employment is highly relevant to all the countries of the Carib-
bean. 
Many of the English-speaking Caribbean countries— 
particularly Guyana and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago—have over the last few years been 
seeking to reduce dependence on the transnational corporation. 
Although the need for foreign exchange will continue to be 
very acute and may well slow down the pace of bringing key 
sectors of the economies under national control, it would be 
extremely naive to believe that those Caribbean countries 
with radical or nationalist economic policies will make a 
complete about-face and open up their economies indiscrimi-
nately to direct foreign investments. What is more likely is 
the adoption by these countries of more selective and flexible 
and less dogmatic policies on direct foreign investment and 
the transnational corporations. Both the improvement of the 
terms under which technology is "transferred" by the trans-
national corporations and the local and regional development 
and application of more appropriate technologies would 
seem to be tendencies that are likely to be strengthened in the 
future in all the Caribbean countries. 
INTERNAL EFFORTS FOR ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
The New International Economic Order deals fundamentally 
with the deep-seated imbalances in international economic 
relationships between developing and developed countries. 
But very few serious Third World advocates of the New Inter-
national Economic Order would ignore the need for serious 
internal efforts at mobilization of resources and transformation 
of economic and social structures. These efforts and trans-
formations, it is generally agreed, should be pursued through 
vigorous programs for developing food production, for 
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mobilizing internal financial resources, and more generally 
for pursuing a "basic needs" development strategy. 
Fortunately, in most of the countries of the Caribbean 
Archipelago, the need for such internal efforts and such trans-
formations aiming at a socially just pattern of economic growth 
and development is clearly recognized irrespective of size, 
economic and political orientation, level and ranges of human 
and natural resources, and stage of development of the various 
countries. There are how very few governments in the Caribbean 
area who would dare to support explicitly the pursuit of eco-
nomic and social elitism in their development strategies. 
CONCL UDING OBSER VA TION 
To conclude: all the Caribbean countries have a vital inter-
est in the realization of most of the fundamental proposals 
for a New International Economic Order. They tend to see the 
achievement of such an order as widening their development 
options and so contributing, if not to the ending, at least to 
the diminution of the area's historical legacy of external 
economic dependence and fragmentation. 
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APPENDIX I 
Selected Economic Data on Caribbean Area 
POPULATION GN? POPULATION GNP PER EXPORTS IMPORTS 
C000) AREA (US$m) DENSITY . CAPITA FOB CIF 
COUNTRIES (c) Mi. (b) (•> (e) 
1. Barbados 247(a) 166 379(d) 1,488 1,534 86 79 
2. Guyana 770 83,000 400 9 510(d) 298 357 
3. Jamaica 2 ,042 4,411 2,270 463 1,110 608 689 
4. Trinidad 6. Tobago 1 ,082 1,980 2,170 546 2,000 2,213 2 p 158 
5. Bahamas (j) 204 4,404 630 46 3,110 1,094 972 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
MORE DEVELOPED 4 ,345 93,961 5,849 46 1,346 4,299 4,255 
6. Antigua (& Dependencies) 71 171 60 415 840 24 (k) 53 (k) 
7. Belize 140 8,867 90 16 670 37 40 
8. Dominica 75 290 40 259 . 560 9(1) 17(1) 
9. Grenada 110 133 40 827 390 10(1) 20(1) 
10. Montserrat 13(g) 38 n.a. 342 n.a. 0.4(1) 6(1) 
11. St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla 49 155 30 316 640 6(1) 13(1) 
12. St. Lucia 107 238 60 450 580 13(1) 37(1) 
13. St. Vincent 90 150 40 600 420 5(1) 20(1) 
14. British Virgin Islands (j) 10(f) 59 n. a. 169 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
15. Cayman Islands (j) 10(f) 100 n.a.' 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
16. Turks & Caicos (j ) 6 166 n.a. 36 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
APPENDIX I (Continued) 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
LESS DEVELOPED 681 10,367 n.a. 66 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
17. Dominican Republic 4,695 18,703 3,390 251 720 716 730 
18. Haiti 4,584 10,714 850 428 190 190 209 
19. Cuba 9,332 44,218 7,460 211 800 n.a. n.a. 
20. Puerto Rico 3,090 3,435 7,120 900 2,300 n.a. n.a. 
21. U.S. Virgin Islands 63(f) 133 n.a. 474 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
22. Netherland Antilles 242 394 410 614 1,680 2,111 2,155 
23. Martinique 325 425 770 765 2,350 124 120 
24. Guadeloupe (& Dependencies) 325 685 490 - 474 1,500 88 89 
25. Cayenne 56 35,135 100 2 1,680 4 6 
26. Suriname 368 63,251 500 6 1,370 275 303 
GRAND TOTAL 28,106 281,421 n;a. 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
NOTES: n.a. - not available; (a)' - mid-1976; (b) - GNP at market prices 1975; (c) - mid-1975; (d) - 1976 data; (e) - U.S. $m 1976; (0 -
1970 Census; (g) - 1972 Census; (h) - population per square mile;(i) - 1975 data;(j) - non-CARICOM country; (k) - 1974 data; (I) - 1973 
data. 
SOURCES: World Bank Atlas 1977 (World Bank );The Times Atlas of the World (Comprehensive Edition, 1975); International Financial Sta-
tistics (IMF. February 1978); Direction of Trade (IMF, 1970-l916);Annual Digest of Statistics 1975 (ECCM Secretariat); Digest of Trade Sta-
tistics of CARICOMMember States (CAR1COM Secretariat, September 1976). 
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